MODELS OF SOUTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION
AND BRAZIL’S INTERNATIONAL PROJECTION STRATEGIES

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Abstract

Since 1960, Brazil has been playing a significant role in the process of South American integration, starting with the creation of ALALC. However, the evolution of these efforts has not been steady due to political issues such as the emergence of Authoritarian regimes in the 1970s, regional rivalries, economic difficulties and infrastructural constraints. After the redemocratization of Latin America in the 1980s, and the emergence of ALADI, new attempts of creating a profitable framework of engagement were made in the region and Brazilian foreign policy gained several ground in these matters, with the creation of MERCOSUR in the early 1990s. In spite of the foreign debt crisis, the neoliberal agenda of the Washington Consensus and domestic instabilities, South America regional integration sustained a positive path in the midst of several adaptations since MERCOSUR. With Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Luis Inacio Lula da Silva governments in Brazil, these projects matured into political and economic programs of cooperation and policies coordination that led to IIRSA and to UNASUR. Both these projects had political goals, as well as infrastructure and development aims, exploring economic and strategic regional potentials of the region such as in the energetic and industrial fields. The aim of this article is to analyze Brazil’s role in the process of South American integration and the different models experienced by the region in search of its strengthening and international projection, focusing on the Brazilian experience and its core initiatives as the roots of this growing autonomy.

Key Words: South America, Regional Integration, Brazilian Foreign Policy
Introduction

Since the beginning of the 21st century, Brazilian foreign policy is heavily investing in projects of integration in its regional space, leading to initiatives such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Deepened by Luís Inácio Lula da Silva presidency (2003/2010), this strategy of international power projection is based on previous proposals and ongoing arrangements as the Common Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR) and even discussions regarding trade liberalization and development agendas of the 1960s and 1970s. From this period on, Brazil is working through different models of integration trying to reinforce its regional basin and global position. These projects have distinct political and economic features as well as international ambitions mainly after the end of the Cold War. Also, throughout these decades, these projects showed some oscillations towards Brazil and the region relations with the United States (US), in the axis of alignment and autonomy.

Faced by these realities and the current status of South American integration and Brazil’s international agenda, the aim of this paper is to examine the evolution of both these features. Therefore, we aim to understand the links between these models of integration and Brazilian power strategies, analyzing its challenges and prospects.

Development and Latin America: Integration in the 1960s and 1970s

From the 1940s to the 1960s, major Latin American nations tried to implement industrialization projects that would allow them to overcome their traditional international projection in the world economy as exporters of primary products. Therefore, industrialization became the main instrument to alter their place in the world’s balance of power. For most countries in the region, this strategy was dominant for three decades, whereas in Brazil it was the main choice of development from the 1930s till the 1970s. During five decades, industrialization was the key tool for Brazil to update its place in the international division of labor and balance of power. Even during some moments of crisis, such as in the 1960s, this strategy was not changed.

Although this development was not based on a common regional strategy or sustained by coordinated policy efforts, these nations had found in the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), a forum to discuss these
issues of development, in particular the core theoretical basin and legitimation of ongoing industrialization policies. Nevertheless, these common economic ground have not led to regional integration process, since the economic ties amongst the nations was too feeble to ignite a common agenda.

In this framework, Brazil opted to strengthen its domestic market as a pillar for its import substitution strategy. Outside our borders, the country remained an exporter of primary products. For instance, Asian nations followed a different option, and focused their development in a diversification of their exports, upgrading their international stance. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China are some examples of this pattern. Latin American nations, Brazil mostly, depended on their exports to gain resources to finance its import substitution project (coffee in Brazil was the main commodity). This option, added to the lack of proper infrastructure that would allow the facilitation of trade, led to the absence of significant contacts of Latin America neighbors.

In Brazil’s case, as soon as the industrialization succeeded, during the 1950s with Juscelino Kubistchek “Plano de Metas”, that defined several development priorities for the modernization of the nation’s economy, the domestic market was viewed as insufficient to absorb these new trends. This perception would become common in the 1960s, and even ECLA started to argue in favor of enlarging export markets to sustain this agenda. Therefore, to complement the small scale of some domestic Latin markets, integration was defined as a possible means to keep the track of industrialization going in the long run.

The creation of the European Community in 1957 (Treaty of Rome) spread the notion worldwide, and not only in Latin America, that this arrangement would mean less access to European markets, reducing partners and exports. The adoption of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), that is still a focus of controversy at the World Trade Organization (WTO), hit agricultural exporting nations harder. For Latin America, then, regional integration started to be viewed as a possible option for economic engagement and strengthening, in a defensive fashion towards Europe. Also, preferential trade agreements amongst some South American nations, such as the ones between Brazil-Argentina, Chile-Argentina. Chile-Peru, were near their end and no exceptions
to the rule of Most Favored Nations (MFN) were accepted according to the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) (TAMAMES, 1974).

ALALC (Latin American Area of Free Trade) was established in the 1960s, in Montevideo, Uruguay, between Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay (Colombia and Equator joined in 1961, Venezuela in 1966 and Bolivia in 1967). This process came along significant changes in the political and economical realm of Latin America nations. Military coups were held in Argentina in 1962, 1966 and 1967, in Brazil, 1964, and Uruguay and Chile 1973. In a sense, military regimes and economic crisis characterized the region from the 1960s-1980s. Brazil took a different path from its neighbors. Whereas the majority of military regimes have chosen the road of economic liberalization, which was brief in Brazil (1964-1967), Brazil’s options were towards industrialization (accompanied by income concentration) (CANO, 2002).

Even though ALALC could have helped in the opening of economies, with proposals regarding tax reductions to zero till 1972, the process fell short. Trade talks amongst Latin American nations were very difficult due to the absence of common rules, the need to negotiate case by case and the disrespect of rules by nations. Also, in 1969 the Caracas Protocol, that altered the Montevideo Treaty, was not able to deal with exchange issues and many political compromises were not followed, added to the ongoing crisis. (TAMAMES, 1974). Since all countries were trying to increase their exports and achieve a positive trade balance, their policy tended to go against a compromise for integration.

In addition, Brazil turned inward due to its own industrialization project and it was more focused in closing its markets to neighbors, than opening it. The country was interested in strengthening its domestic basin, and exports were viewed as a compensation, of the internal market was not able to absorb all the production. Also, Brazil exports to Latin American members of ALALC was not significant, ranging rom 10 to 13% of our exports (with small peaks in the late 1970s of 16%-18%), as well as to other regions of the world such as Africa (which participation in exports grew from 2 to 8% of the total). The creation of Latin American Economic System (SELA) in 1975 and of ALADI (Latin American Association of Integration) in 1981, were more a reflex of ALALC failures than of its success, since regional integration started to be
viewed in a more lose framework, without fulfilling the projects of zero taxes and free flow of trade. Moreover, it opened the door to sub regional projects, not encompassing all ALALC members. Political instabilities and the debt crisis only worsened the prospects of an all encompassing Latin American arrangement. (TAMAMES, 1974).

Brazil’s option of sustaining and expanding its economic development through foreign debt during the 1970s shows that the country viewed the world economy as stable, even though that decade was characterized by crisis such as the break of the dollar-gold standard. At that time, the government considered that it would be able to end the modernization process fast, allowing Brazil to ascend to a different place in the world’s power balance. It was a current belief that the nation growing industrial assets, the consolidation of hard machinery and the diversification of the energy matrix with ethanol and nuclear energy would lessen the dependence on foreign oil (leading to the reduction of imports of this expensive product, which prices were extremely high due to the first oil crisis in 1973). Brazil’s-Germany Nuclear Agreement was representative of both: the energy diversification and the strengthening of Brazil in the world scenario (CERVO; BUENO, 2008).

Linked to this, Brazilian foreign policy was also a component of the development industrial project, and an instrument to strengthen the nation economically. Nevertheless, Brazil was not yet a policy maker or rule setter in this field, even though it searched for more opportunities. Therefore, its level of compromise with other nations, either in the world, or in the region, was conditioned to its individual interest that kept the nation apart its neighbors or potential partners. In this sense, Brazil was not a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, and its participation in G-77 and ALALC was less present than it should have been. Nevertheless, Brazil’s international relations focused on the deepening of alternatives worldwide, mostly in the arena of South-South cooperation. So, even without a strong political agenda, Brazil was seeking new alternatives venues for its exports and more recognition for its power. Added to this, the Cold War bipolar agenda was also a natural limiting factor to more autonomous initiatives. So, there was no sustainability in Brazil’s domestic or international agenda, even though the country experienced significant growth in
the first half of the 1970s. The second oil shock in 1979 and debt crisis of 1982 put into check any expectations of being a lead power (CUEVA, 1989).

In a nutshell, integration for Brazil was an instrumental tactics, as well as for other Latin American nations, which led to the relative failure of ALALC and a reality of distance between neighbors. The crisis of the late 1970s and the early 1980s, however, meant the need to rethink these views, leading to a new attempt to work together in the region.

**Economic Crisis and Political Arrangements: Brazil and Argentina Partnership and the Built of MERCOSUR in the 1980s**

If in the 1970s, Brazil and its South American neighbors parted ways regarding their strategies of national development, with Brazil betting on a State driven industrial project and its partners in policies of liberalization. Due to incoming crisis in the 1980s, this distancing was replaced by a political and economic convergence, leading to the reorientation of domestic and foreign polices of these nations. For instance, Brazil and Argentina that were going through the final days of their military regimes rehearsed a rapprochement during the Malvinas War.

Usually seen as a menace by Argentina, Brazil officially sustained a position of neutrality during the conflict. However, this “neutrality” tended to Argentina, since Brazil did not allow British air forces to male use of Brazilian aerial space. After the end of the military regimes in the mid-1980s, geopolitical differences were rapidly overcome, which opened the door for a strategy of bilateral integration. The lose framework of ALADI contributed to this, but the defining issue that led to the closeness was the isolation endured by both nations due to the debt crisis and the limitations of the model of import substitution industrialization and the closure of domestic markets.

The turning point in this relation was the Declaration of Iguaçu in 1985 that reaffirmed the wish to cooperate in the arena of nuclear energy for pacific uses (at the same date they signed the Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy) and the relevance of integration in the levels of infrastructure and economic matters. At that moment, the High Level Commission for Cooperation and Economic Bilateral Integration was created. In 1986, the Brazil-Argentina Act of Integration established the Program of Integration and Economic cooperation, which goal
was the creation of a common economic space through the selective opening of markets. This goal was fulfilled in 1988 with the Treaty of Integration, Cooperation and Development that established a ten-year maximum period for the complete liberalization of reciprocal trade. The Treaty envisioned the elimination of all tariff and non-tariff obstacles regarding the trade of goods and services. Protocols regarding trade linked to the Treaty were consolidated in the Agreement of Economic Complementarity no. 14 form ALADI (OLIVEIRA, 2003).

The scenario of debt crisis, burdens of development and domestic transition led to the rapprochement of Latin American nations (CANO, 2002). At the same time, the convergence was limited due to the same political and economic difficulties that emerged from these crisis. Therefore, the articulation of a broad project of integration as once predicted by ALALC was not possible, due to the loss of autonomy in the region. For Brazilian foreign policy this meant a shrinking of partnerships in the South-South axis, not only for its own problems, but also related to the fact that these nations were suffering from the same political and economic imbalances in the world. Since these markets were unable to absorb Brazilian exports and the country needed the revenues of trade to keep its debt compromises, the exit chosen was to try to recover space in traditional markets of the North (Western Europe and the United States). Instead of selling industrial products, Brazil once more focused on the exports of primary products (commodities).

These nations´ pressures, as well the talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the loan banks were at the center of Brazil´s concerns in the 1980s, leading to a defensive stance. Whereas in the 1970s the prospects favored gains of power that may lead to a new position in the international balance of power, in the 1980s the goal was to, at least, sustain the nation´s previous position and avoid losing ground. This defensive position stretched from the financial to the trade arena (GATT´s Uruguay Round). Instead of putting forward demands in talks, Brazil started to block negotiations tried to avoid concessions in the industrial and services sector, since there was no reciprocity in the agricultural arena.

MERCOSUR´s birth is linked, in its origins, in a defensive strategy, focused on Brazil and Argentina´s perception that there were no further
alternatives in the world scenario for helping solve their economic and political issues, including structural matters such as: inflation, external debt, slow economic growth, poverty and incomplete industrialization. Therefore, bilateral integration and regional alliances were seen as a way out in the long term. Even in Brazil’s Constitution in 1988, Latin America integration received a different attention, being established as a priority for the nation.

Setting the arrangement apart from the 1960s and 1970s realities, when Latin America integration was the focus, this initiative benefited from ALADI’s lose framework, which favored modular, small agreements. Bilateral relations were seen at that time as manner of protecting both nations from the prospects of a world divided in blocs, in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War: the US, the Japanese and the European blocs, tended to deepen, in these nations’ views, their status as peripheral nations, so they turned to one another. However, entering the 1990s, the realities of neoliberal policies would lessen the prospects of this regional integration being seen as autonomous, turning to a tactic of alignment to US policies, in particular in the Americas.

*MERCOSUR and the Liberal Opening of Markets: A Strategy of International Projection During the 1990s Decade*

As previously discussed, the beginning of MERCOSUR, was dependent on the changing prospects of Brazil-Argentina’s relations and their perception of weakness and lack of other world alliances to solve their domestic issues. Although Brazil was trying to preserve its universal foreign policy, the worldwide conditions and domestic problems made it difficult to achieve significant gains in this arena. Therefore, the country started to look more closely to its own region and neighbors in order to upgrade and compensate its development towards autonomy. However, in the early 1990s, bilateral relations evolution into MERCOSUR, bringing Paraguay and Uruguay into the agreement resulted more from an attempt to align to US neoliberal agenda and own projects of integration such as the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) than a project for regional development.

If the 1960s and 1970s were characterized by a foreign policy open to the world, in the 1990s, Brazil’s International relations suffered a setback in their South-South dimension and search for alternatives. After the end of the Cold War, added to the economic and political difficulties internally, this
previous strategy and also the import substitution agenda was seen as prejudicial to national interests. Accordingly to this view, Brazil isolated itself from its main partners, and lost ground compared to the First World. Therefore, it was necessary to change this policies searching for a more “responsible” integration in the main stream of world affairs, represented by the idea of a unipolar balance, focused on the US as the only remaining superpower. For Brazil, this meant not only the abandonment of priorities in the South-South axis, but a revival alignment with this nation (PEC EQUILÔ, 2008).

For instance, the Washington Consensus was vastly implemented by the first civilian government elected after the Military Regime (1964/1985), represented by Fernando Collor de Mello (1990/1992). Collor de Mello in Brazil and Carlos Menem in Argentina (1989/1999) acceleration of the bilateral integration was seen as strategic tool for both nations to signalize to the US that their goals of liberalizing the economy and modernization were strong. Paraguay and Uruguay supported the project since it would mean not only integration with the Brazil-Argentina in the Southern Cone, but also prospects of a good relation with the US. MERCOSUR, in this sense, was seen as tool for economic development, but of a subordinate kind to the US. Also, in relation to this nation, the agreement was a proof of good towards the North American unipolar system, supporting its actions in the region, in the world and in multilateral talks, in particular the end of the Uruguay Round of GATT in which these nations in development conceded several benefits to the North (VIZENTINI, 2008).

These efforts to lessen MERCOSUR of its more autonomous content, nevertheless, were balanced by Brazil’s Ministry of External Relations MRE) actions, that tried to sustain the original goal of the arrangement. This compensatory tactics allowed MERCOSUR to sustain some political links with its independent stance, which was deepened after Collor de Mello was impeached due to corruption accusations in 1992. When Itamar Franco (1992/1994), the Vice-President took power, the main priority of Brazilian foreign policy was redefined, focusing on MERCOSUR, instead of the realignment with the US. Franco’s agenda also attempt to regain the Third World view of Brazil’s International Relations, and alternative South-South partnerships. In addition, the idea of a South American Free Trade Area
(SAFTA) that in the next decade would become the basin of Brazil´s regional agenda was first put forward.

SAFTA, however, was unable to sustain its momentum (as well as the idea of MERCONORTE, a proposal for integrating the North of Brazil with the North of South America fell short). Franco also argued in favor of Brazil´’s permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and for more fair and equal trade talks at GATT. As SAFTA, these demands went no further, but begin to represent a more political active stance that would emerge in Luis Inacio Lula da Silva government (2003/2010).

Two reasons can be pointed to explain why Franco was unable to sustain this autonomous actions and the recovery of alignment that would once again follow in Fernando Henrique Cardoso´’s administration (1995/2002): the ongoing economic crisis that heightened Brazil´’s vulnerability and US pressures towards the region that led to the creation of the North Americana Free Trade Agreement between the US, Mexico and Canada (NAFTA) and the launch of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) in December 1994. The FTAA recovered the principles of the failed EAI, mainly the built of a hemispheric free trade area, and was used to attract once more the governments in the region to the US sphere of influence. FTAA talks were scheduled to end in 2005, for instance. Once more, the US idea behind this tactics was to divide the region and, for the nations in South America, the FTAA seemed a new chance to acquire more benefits from the US to help their economic development such as aid, investments and technology.

None came true, the US offered no substantial benefits for these countries that, due to their own crisis had to search for local alternatives. Nevertheless, for the regional elites that embraced alignment as a pattern of action externally and neoliberalism internally, the answer was still in the North-South cooperation. Only the deep crisis of the end of the 1990s changed their pattern of action, but, nonetheless, not totally their perception as will be discussed, represented by the ongoing polarization of left and right wing trends in these nations’ politics and electoral process.

Although Brazil was not one affected by this neoliberal crisis as deep as Argentina, Venezuela, Bolivia and Equator, it suffered some severe instability that even put MERCOSUR at risk. Even though FHC´’s government was able to
lessen Brazil’s vulnerability due to the success of the stabilization Plan (Plano Real) implemented by the own Cardoso as Franco’s Finance Minister (beforehand he was ahead of MRE and the replaced by Celso Amorim), the lack of adjustments in exchange rates, slow growth and unemployment took their toll. In 1997/1999, Brazil and other nations were hit by the world crisis and were forced to devalue their coins and search for alternative means to develop. Brazil’s Real devaluation led Argentina and MERCOSUR to one of their worst crisis since its launch in 1991 and the arrangement was questioned in its survival. Also, it should be reminded that this devaluation came only after FHC’s reelection in 1998. This crisis, nonetheless, would characterize his second term and the adjustment, once more, of Brazilian foreign policy towards autonomy and regional integration process from 2000 onwards

South America and Brazil’s Geopolitical Space: Rebuilding Ties in a New Foreign Policy Agenda (2000/2010)

Analyzing Brazil’s foreign policy in FHC’s government, shows two different patterns of action: one of alignment from 1995 till 1999 and a second of attempts to recover space in 2000/2002, in which regional integration in South America played a relevant role, added to the concept of “asymmetric globalization”. From 1995/1999, the focus was centered in North-South relations. These relations were mainly directed to improve Brazil’s stance in multilateral organizations such the UNSC and to achieve more access to Northern markets, in particular in the agricultural field. The tactics applied were related to a pragmatic alignment to the US and the rules of the international system, proving that Brazil was a reliable partner globally. The idea was to obtain “autonomy through integration”, abiding to regimes and the North rhetoric of modernization and First worldism.

At the regional level, this alignment, however, was not full, since Brazil and the US disagreed in the FTAA talks regarding the opening of markets and the preservation of previous integration efforts such as MERCOSUR. Brazil defended the position of preserving MERCOSUR (building blocks), whereas the US preferred the dissolution of pre-existing arrangements. Nevertheless, Brazil and its MERCOSUR partners avoided difficult decisions regarding the deepening of the bloc, with discussions regarding common policies and projects of development that may lead to a more solid framework and political identity.
The option was to engage new partners in the region, even if not as full members, showing no advances in the matters that meant coordination or changes in sovereignty.

For the US, even though Brazil was politically and economically still defending neoliberal ideas, its stance regarding the FTAA was viewed as a problem. The absence of progresses in the country’s interests and the lack of benefits, added to the pressures the US still sustained in the nation’s markets and its protectionism were seen with concern in Brazil. However, the turning point to change FHC’s foreign policy was related to the mentioned 1997/1999 neoliberal crisis that hit Latin America, and the world, hard. The crisis led the government to develop a more critical stance in its international positioning, discussing the concept of “asymmetric globalization”. The concept was not confrontational in its heart, but was directed to present Brazil’s demands more clearly in the world arena. Brazil was not fighting against globalization, but arguing in favor of its adjustment so that all countries could benefit equally and not only the ones which conducted the process.

In the regional level, FHC’s response was the creation of IIRSA, the Integration of South American Regional Infrastructure, trying to explore South America’s strategic potentials in the energy, transportation, telecommunications arena. IIRSA, in Lula’s administration, would be sustained (PECEQUILO, 2008). The reconstruction of the regional space and political influence, as well as a different exercise of Brazilian power locally, was deepened by other Lula’s project, namely, SACN (South America Community of Nations, CASA in Portuguese that means “home” in English). Soon after, the SACN would evolve into UNASUR in 2007, which is the current framework of an encompassing South American regional integration process, which was inspired by the ideas of SAFTA. MERCOSUR and other local arrangements are still evolving, added to alternative projects such as ALBA (Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas) promoted by Venezuela. Either in Brazil or Venezuela, these proposals with an autonomous political content and economic projects of cooperation towards development and social issues, are the result of the weakening of the neoliberal 1990s project, the US power vacuum in the region and dismissal of the FTAA.

Another very interesting features of these Brazilian projects is their South American focus, strengthening the continental basin for a platform of talks with
other regions such as Africa and Asia. During Lula´s government the realization of the South American Arab Countries Summit (ASPA) and the South American African Countries Summit (ASA) were relevant progress in the projection of the region. Therefore, the geopolitical dimension of South America was viewed by Lula´s administration as a priority for Brazil´s international stance. In addition, these new perceptions towards South America also represent Brazil´s soft imperialism in the region, and an attempt to contain, at least politically due to the ongoing economic limitations of the majority of the region´s nations, China´s advance in search for markets and export commodities, and US hegemonic shadow in the hemisphere.

Final Thoughts

Although Brazil was one of ALALC´s founder in 1970s, its development strategy to change and enhance its international projection was focused in the import substitution industrialization agenda that dominated the nation´s policies form the 1930s till the 1970s. During the 1960s and 1970s, Brazilian foreign policy worked in consonance with this project worldwide, searching for new markets in the South. Nevertheless, the Latin America market was viewed as a second rank tactics, since the country was not willing to open its markets to its neighbors through a project of integration.

In the 1980s, this global expansion was replaced by a defensive stance, and Brazil was trying to avoid losing ground due to its political and economic crisis. The situation was somewhat similar in other Latin American nations, and for instance, Argentina was even weaker than Brazil, which meant that any kind of recovery through cooperation was difficult. Nevertheless, both countries improved their bilateral links that, in the 1990s, led to creation of MERCOSUR, in the framework of the neoliberal agenda. In this sense, the opening of markets and the adoption of liberal measures encompassed in the beginning of MERCOSUR was part of the nations´ international repositioning towards the North after the end of the Cold War. So, regional integration, at that time, was considered a relevant instrument for Brazil´s International Relations.

As discussed, the country deepened its ties with its neighbors, and the arrangement benefited from Brazil´s Real stability. Moreover, the political orientation of the agreement gained more autonomous features at least
regionally. However, Brazil had difficulties in making use of MERCOSUR as a means of enhancing its position in multilateral talks, showed the limits of its political influence. Although MERCOSUR was able to resist the FTAA, there were no further political coordination in the global arena and even in the region the arrangement avoided the advance of supranational structures.

The crisis in the 1990s and the political and economic crisis brought by neoliberalism, added to the emergence of left wing governments in the region, changed this stance, leading to IIRSA and the current UNASUR. Lula´s government played a decisive role in recovering a more political autonomous agenda for regional integration, going further than MERCOSUR in the effort to build a more cohesive South America. Therefore, from 2003 onwards, MERCOSU remained a priority, but the political ideals and practices of integration were enlarged. South America and its arrangements were seen as an instrument for improving Brazil´s international projection in the world. In spite for some disagreements with its neighbors regarding economic matters, Brazil´s leadership in South America is being legitimized by the current mechanisms of integration that are in place and others that are being improved. A more assertive stance in multilateral organizations and the recognition of Brazil´s power as an emergent nation, a global and regional power, were some goals achieved and are still in place.

Either in the region, or in the world, South-South cooperation allowed Brazil to strengthen its positions and gain ground in the ongoing balance of power in the world scenario. For South America, it meant the recovery of regional integration from a stronger point of view, a process still in construction, with important weight in Brazil´s international projection.

References


